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Casenote

Keeping the Government Away
from Medicaid Recipients' Pocketbook: Protecting Medicaid
Recipients' Rights to Proceeds of
Third-Party Settlements in
Arkansas Department of Health &
Human Services v. Ahlborn

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Arkansas Department ofHealth & Human Services v. Ahlborn,' the
United States Supreme Court approached the contentious issue of
whether Medicaid and state Medicaid agencies can recover expenses
incurred on behalf of a Medicaid recipient from the entirety of the

1.

126 S. Ct. 1752 (2006).
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recipient's third-party settlement.2 Over the past decade, several states
and the United States Department of Health and Human Services have
reached opposite results on this question. In its unanimous opinion, the
Court quelled the debate by limiting Medicaid and the corresponding
state programs' recoveries from third-party settlements to the proceeds
representing repayment of medical expenses,3 a move likely to cause
changes for the federal government, state governments, and individual
Medicaid recipients.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A motor vehicle accident on January 2, 1996, rendered Heidi Ahlborn
permanently disabled.4 Ahlborn was a nineteen-year-old college student
and future teacher, but the accident left her brain-damaged and
incapable of continuing her education.' Ahlborn filed suit against the
allegedly responsible individuals and entities, seeking various damages
arising out of the vehicle accident. These damages included the
following: (1) permanent injury; (2) past and future medical expenses; (3)
past and future pain, suffering, and mental anguish; (4) past loss of
earnings and working time; and (5) permanent impairment of ability to
earn in the future. In 2002 Ahlborn settled her suit with the defendants
and her underinsured motorist insurer for a total of $550,000, without
allocating the settlement among types of damages. 6
Shortly after the accident, Ahlborn applied and qualified for Medicaid
in Arkansas, leading the Arkansas Department of Human Services
("ADHS"), the state agency charged with administering Arkansas's
Medicaid program, to pay $215,645.30 of medical expenses on Ahlborn's
behalf.7 Arkansas law requires Medicaid recipients to assign their
rights of recovery from a third party to ADHS.8 As a result, ADHS
asserted a lien on the settlement proceeds. In response, Ahlborn
initiated the present suit against ADHS, seeking a declaratory judgment
to limit ADHS's recovery to the portion of the settlement representing
past medical expenses.9
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas,
faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, denied Ahlborn's

2.

Id. at 1756.

3.

Id. at 1767.

4. Ahlborn v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 397 F.3d 620, 622 (8th Cir. 2005).
5. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 126 S. Ct. 1752, 1757 (2006).
6. Ahlborn v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 280 F. Supp. 2d 882, 882 (E.D. Ark. 2003).
7. Ahlborn, 397 F.3d at 622.
8. ARK CODE ANN. § 20-77-307(a) (West 2001).
9.

Ahlborn, 397 F.3d at 622.
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motion for summary judgment and granted ADHS's motion for summary
judgment.' Prior to the trial court's order granting ADHS's motion for
summary judgment, the parties had stipulated that if ADHS's argument
prevailed, ADHS would recover the full $215,645.30. The parties also
stipulated that $35,581.47 represented a reasonable measure of the
medical expenses portion of Ahlborn's settlement and was the amount
that ADHS would recover if Ahlborn's argument prevailed."
Ahlborn argued that the federal Medicaid laws preempted the
Arkansas Medicaid laws to the extent that Arkansas's law allowed for
reimbursement beyond settlement proceeds that reasonably represent
third-party compensation for medical expenses.12 The court reasoned
that the statutory text, an opinion of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services, and the legislative history of Medicaid led
to the conclusion that Congress intended for the Medicaid statutes to
provide states the right to recover fully from third-party payments to a
Medicaid recipient."'
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded the case with instructions for the lower court to render
judgment for ADHS according to Ahlborn's lower calculation. 4 The
court adopted a "straightforward interpretation of the text" of the federal
Medicaid statutes to conclude that key Arkansas statutes were
preempted by the federal statutes if they required Ahlborn to assign her
rights to recover third-party liability payments beyond the cost of
medical expenses. 5
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the court
of appeals, holding that federal Medicaid laws do not permit ADHS to
recover any amount beyond that which reasonably represents third-party
compensation for medical expenses and that "Arkansas'[s] third-party
liability provisions are unenforceable insofar as they compel a different
conclusion."' 6

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Ahlborn, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 889.
Id. at 883.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 888.
Ahlborn, 397 F.3d at 628.
Id. at 625, 628.
Ahlborn, 126 S. Ct. at 1767.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Medicaid Program

Medicaid is a joint program between the federal government and
participating state governments in which the federal government
provides over half of the program's cost in exchange for the states
complying with certain statutory requirements. 17 To ensure that
Medicaid can recover costs from liable third parties, federal law requires
state Medicaid agencies to "take all reasonable measures to ascertain the
legal liability of third parties ... to pay for care and services available
under [Medicaid]."' 8 The primary mechanism for accomplishing this
goal is the assignment statute, which requires recipients to assign to
Medicaid their "rights ...to payment for medical care from any third
party."9 Protecting against an over-invasive government recovery from
a recipient, federal law also proscribes placing a lien on the property of
a Medicaid recipient before the recipient's death.2 ° Unfortunately,
these statutes do not uniformly describe the types of third-party
payment from which the government can recover.2'
The federal
statutes declare that the state should seek repayment of the recipient's
Medicaid assistance "to the extent of such legal liability," departing from
the assignment statute's language restricting the government interest
to third-party compensation for medical expenses.2 2 Furthermore, the
federal statutes apparently grant Medicaid a priority over the recipient
to third-party payment by stating that "any amount collected by the
State under an assignment" should first satisfy the state's medical
payments while only giving the recipient a remainder interest in such
funds. 23 Though detailed in its provisions, courts have interpreted the
federal Medicaid statutes with contradictory results.
The other half of Medicaid is state participation. The federal
provisions require states to enact their own statutory regimes to
administer state plans in accordance with the federal statutes.24
Arkansas, like many other states, enacted laws which, while on the
surface appear to be identical to the federal counterparts, were

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 126 S. Ct. 1752, 1758 (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (2000).
Id. § 1396k(a)(1)(A) (2000); accord 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(H) (2000).
Id. § 1396p(a)(1) (2000).
See id. §§ 1396a(a)(25)(A), 1396k(a)(1)(A), 1396p(a)(1).
Id. §§ 1396a(a)(25)(B) (2000), 1396k(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 1396k(b) (2000).
See id. § 1396a(a)(25)(A).
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sufficiently different to lead courts to interpret them differently.25 The
Arkansas assignment statute, states that all Medicaid applicants
automatically assign their rights "to any settlement, judgment, or award
which may be obtained against any third party... to the full extent" of
Medicaid's medical payments for the recipient.2 6 Arkansas law also
imposes a lien upon any "settlement, judgment, or award received by the
recipient from a third party."27 These state statutory provisions do not
match their companion federal provisions, paving the road towards the
Court's decision.
B.

Contrary State Supreme Court Decisions

Arkansas is not alone in enacting laws that do not completely match
the federal provisions. The Washington Supreme Court addressed such
an apparent mismatch in 2000 in Wilson v. State.2" Much like Arkansas's statute, Washington's assignment statute seemingly allowed the
state agency to recover from "'any recovery ... to the extent of the value
of the assistance paid.'" 29 In Wilson the state Medicaid agency asserted
a lien against any recovery. When the recipient negotiated a settlement
in this medical malpractice case, the agency asserted the right of
reimbursement, and the recipient sued the agency to prevent recovery.a° The recipient argued that any lien violated the federal anti-lien
provision, and the court framed the issue as "[w]hether federal law
prohibits the imposition of a state statutory recovery lien against the
proceeds of a Medicaid recipient's third party recovery beyond that
portion of the recovery allocated specifically to medical expenses.""1
The court showed great deference to congressional intent in premising
its interpretation upon the belief that Congress intended for Medicaid "to
be the payment source of last resort."3 2 With this intent in mind, the
court interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(H) 33 to authorize the state
to recover to the full extent of Medicaid payments, rather than limiting
recovery to payments for medical expenses."' As a result, the state law
allowing for full recovery of Medicaid's expenses did not conflict with the

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
47).
33.
34.

See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-77-307 (West 2001).
Id. § 20-77-307(a).
Id. § 20-77-307(c).
10 P.3d 1061 (Wash. 2000).
Id. at 1064 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 43.20B.060(2) (1998)).
Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1064.
Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 99-146, at 7, 16 (1985), as reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 42,
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(H).
Wilson, 10 P.3d at 1064.
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federal scheme and actually "advance[d] the purposes and objectives of
the federal law." 5 The court also held that the federal anti-lien
provision did not preclude recovery because the recipient assigned the
third-party recovery right to the extent paid out by the state, and the
resulting lien blocked any property transfer of the proceeds before the
funds became the Medicaid recipient's property.3 6 The four dissenting
justices partially forecasted the United States Supreme Court's position
of six years later by stating that the majority had failed to interpret
§ 1396a(a)(25)(H) in light of the surrounding provisions in the statute.3 7
According to the dissent, the remainder of the federal Medicaid statutes
only provided for assignment of "payments from another party for health
care items or services," and thus, the state laws that provide further
assignment conflict with these federal statutes."
Nevertheless, the
majority utilized congressional intent in interpreting the federal
Medicaid statutes to allow recovery from a recipient's third-party
settlements to the full extent of Medicaid's payments, without restriction. 9
In 2002 the Utah Supreme Court also approached the property and
anti-lien issue in Houghton v. Department of Health.4 ° In this class
action, the plaintiffs were Medicaid recipients whose settlement proceeds
were subjected to a state lien. The plaintiffs argued that compensation
for non-medical damages was their property, and thus, Utah's statute
granting a priority to full Medicaid reimbursement before the recipient
recovered anything violated the federal anti-lien provision. 41 The court
quickly dismissed this challenge by concluding, as did the Washington
Supreme Court in Wilson, that "liens against third-party settlement
proceeds are valid because those proceeds do not42become a Medicaid
recipient's property until Medicaid is reimbursed."
A dissent in Houghton foreshadowed the Court's approach in Arkansas
Department of Health & Human Services v. Ahlborn43 by interpreting
the federal Medicaid statutes to limit the sources from which Medicaid
can recover." The dissent argued that because Medicaid's interest is

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
part).

Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1069 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
Id.
Wilson, 10 P.3d at 1065-66.
57 P.3d 1067 (Utah 2002).
Id. at 1068-69.
Id. at 1069.
126 S. Ct. 1752 (2006).
Houghton, 57 P.3d at 1072 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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premised upon the recipient's assignment of his or her right to recover
medical expenses, Medicaid's right to recovery is limited to the third
party's actual liability for medical expenses.45 Classifying the majority
view as causing a "sweeping and indiscriminate right to third-party
payments,"46 the dissent argued that the majority's interpretation
conflicted with the congressional intent and objective and therefore
should be preempted.47 Nevertheless, this more restrictive view of
Medicaid's right to recovery was relegated to a dissent rather than a
majority opinion.
C. Guidance from the United States Department of Health and
Human Services
The United States Department of Health and Human Services
Departmental Appeals Board ("DAB") has also been active in interpreting the federal Medicaid laws.4 8 In 1995 the Health Care Financing
Administration ("HCFA') 49 disallowed California $7.5 million in federal
Medicaid money on grounds that this was the amount that "California
should have collected from third party liability (TPL) settlements and
awards received by Medicaid recipients."" The HCFA asserted that
according to the federal Medicaid regime and California statutes, the
state is entitled and obligated to recover the full amount of benefits paid
out to the recipient from any third-party recovery.5' The DAB reasoned
that Medicaid's payments are to be a last resort and that Congress
intended for reimbursement from any third party source. 2 As a result,
Medicaid would be paid in full prior to when the Medicaid recipient
obtained any of the settlement, regardless of the classification of the
settlement proceeds.5" The DAB also agreed with HCFA's argument
that Medicaid had a superior interest to the recipient in the recovery
and that HCFA had the right "to characterize recoveries from third
parties first as payments for medical care."'
The agency opinion

45. Id.
46. Id. at 1078 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. Id. at 1079.
48. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs., DAB No. 1504 (1995), 1995 WL 66444; Wash. State
Dep't of Social & Health Servs., DAB No. 1561 (1996), 1996 WL 157123 (holding proper the
decision to disallow $75,395 in federal Medicaid assistance from the state of Washington
for not pursuing full Medicaid recovery from third-party payments).
49. HCFA is the federal agency formerly charged with administering Medicaid.
50. DAB No. 1504, 1995 WL 66444, at *1.
51. Id.

52. Id.
53. See id.
54. Id. at *6.
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clearly supported the positions taken by the state agencies in Wilson and
Houghton: Medicaid can take full recovery from recipients' third-party
recoveries without regard to the classification of such settlement
proceeds.
D.

Late-Breaking Dissention

Regardless of the uniformity arising throughout the past decade, the
balance of opinion began to shift in recent years. The first major
decision to interpret the federal regime as disallowing reimbursement
from funds beyond those representing medical costs was Martin v. City
of Rochester.55 In Martin an individual suffered debilitating injuries in
a motor vehicle accident. The individual qualified for Medicaid and
subsequently received $267,754.50 worth of medical payments from
Medicaid. The recipient filed suit, seeking the following: (1) past and
future medical expenses; (2) past and future pain and suffering; (3)
disability; (4) disfigurement; (5) past loss of earnings; and (6) loss of
earning capacity. After six years of litigation, the recipient negotiated
a $220,000 settlement with the liable parties for all causes and claims.
Important to note is the fact that the parties did not allocate the
settlement proceeds between the different types of damages alleged. The
State, made a party through involuntary joinder, then asserted a crossclaim for reimbursement against the recipient.56
Unlike the other courts that had approached this issue, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the federal anti-lien provision was unambiguous and had a plain-meaning interpretation.5 7 The court further held
that the proper approach to interpretation is to view each section in the
context of the surrounding sections. 5
In interpreting the federal
assignment provisions 42 U.S.C. § 1396k 9 and § 1396a(a)(25)(H),60
the court held that when read together, these provisions only required
assignment of the recipient's right to recover for medical expenses.6'
This assignment served to transfer the recipient's property rights-but
only the proceeds specific to medical expenses.62 The court then held
that the state's recovery, when limited to the portion of the third-party
recovery representing medical expenses, did not violate the federal anti-

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

642 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2002).
Id. at 5-7.
Id. at 12.
Id. (quoting Am. Family Ins. Group v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273,277 (Minn. 2000)).
42 U.S.C. § 1396k.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(H).
Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 12-13.
Id.

AHLBORN
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lien statute because recovery would not involve any of the recipient's
property and would actually keep intact the recipient's property interest
in his or her other causes of action and resulting proceeds.6" The court
also rejected the HFCA opinions, determining that the interpretations
of the statutes were unreasonable because the interpretations negated
the plain meaning of the statute.' Martin provided a counter-current
to the prevailing jurisprudence on Medicaid recovery.
Martin also provided an important analysis of the effects of this
narrow interpretation of federal statutes upon seemingly broader state
statutes. Minnesota's Medicaid statutes, much like Arkansas's, required
assignment beyond the recipient's recovery for medical expenses.65 The
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the state lien provision's broad
wording was preempted to the extent that it strayed from the federal
provision, as the state statute potentially allowed a lien on all of the
recipient's recovery.66 In regards to the state assignment statute, the
court stated that the federal statute assignment did not preempt it;
nevertheless, the federal anti-lien provision did, as the state's expansion
of the assignment to all of the recipient's damages defeated the purpose
of the federal provision.67
Correspondingly, the Minnesota court
interpreted the text of the federal Medical provisions to restrict the
state's ability to recover from third-party recoveries to only those
amounts representing compensation for medical expenses.
IV.

COURT'S REASONING

Much like the dissenting opinions in most prior lower court decisions
on the issue, the Court in Arkansas Department of Health & Human
Services v. Ahlborn68 unanimously took a strict approach in interpreting the federal Medicaid statutes to restrict the sources from which the
state Medicaid agency can be reimbursed. At the outset, the Court, in
an opinion by Justice Stevens, characterized the crux of the parties'
dispute as depending wholly upon statutory interpretation. 9 Throughout its evaluation, the Court centered upon three key areas: the federal
assignment and third-party liability statutes, the federal anti-lien
statute, and the policy rationales supporting each interpretation. With
these key provisions and considerations in mind, the Court held that

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 22 n.26.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
126 S. Ct. 1752 (2006).
Id. at 1758.
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Medicaid's reimbursement from third-party settlements ended with the
exhaustion of funds reasonably representing medical damages.7 0
A. Leading the Charge: FederalAssignment and Third-Party
Liability Statutes
The Court first addressed ADHS's argument that the federal
assignment and third-party liability statutes allowed Medicaid unfettered reimbursement.7 ' The Court looked to the statutory text, which
states that a Medicaid recipient must "'assign the State any rights...
to payment for medical care from any third party.' 72 The Court noted
that this provision only says payment for "medical care," and not for
other types of damages such as lost wages.73 On the other hand, ADHS
argued that the third-party liability statutes authorized state reimburse74
ment "'for [medical] assistance to the extent of such legal liability.'"
v5
This assertion is reminiscent of the opinion in Wilson v. State as both
arguments utilize the federal third-party liability statutes to vie for an
unrestricted reimbursement. 6 Nevertheless, the Court read all of the
statute's subsections together and held that the statute's phrasing of
"'such legal liability"' refers to the previous subsection's language of
"'the legal liability of third parties ... to pay for care and services
available under the plan,'" rather than the entirety of the third party's
liability."7 As a result, the liability provided extends no further than
the third party's liability for medical care and stops before the third
party's liability for other forms of damages.7"
ADHS also attempted to argue that the state had a right to recovery
"'to the extent that payment has been made under the State plan for

medical assistance for health care items or services

. .

.

,"7

This

argument, present in the Wilson majority and both of the Department
of Health and Human Services appellate board decisions, failed to

70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1762.
Id. at 1760-61.
Id. at 1761 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(a)(1)(A) (2000)) (emphasis supplied by the

Court).
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(B) (2000)) (brackets in original and emphasis
supplied by the Court).
75. 10 P.3d 1061 (Wash. 2000).
76. See id. at 1063-64; Ahlborn, 126 S. Ct. at 1761.
77. Ahlborn, 126 S. Ct. at 1761 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (2000)) (emphasis
supplied by the Court).
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(H) (2000)).
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persuade the Court. ° Instead, the Court read the provision in context,
holding that the last sentence of this statute restricts Medicaid's
reimbursement to the assigned rights to third-party payment for medical
expenses. 8
ADHS asserted a final claim that 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(b) 2 creates
authority for the state to demand full reimbursement before the
recipient gains any recovery.83 Though forwarded by the majority in
Houghton v. Department of Health, 4 the Court rejected this position in
light of the explicit text of the provision.8 5 Rather than allowing for
priority on recovery from the whole settlement, this statutory provision
gives the state priority over the "'amount recovered... under an assignment,'" and the federal assignment statute only includes recovery of
payment for medical care.88
The Court also held that the Arkansas statutes regarding assignment
and third party recovery go beyond the bounds provided by the federal
statutes.87 The Court concluded that the federal statutes are limited
to assignment of and recovery from the cause of action regarding medical
expenses.88 In contrast, the Arkansas statutes could allow a broader
interpretation." The Arkansas assignment statute forces the recipient
to assign not just damages for medical expenses, but also the "right to
any settlement, judgment, or award" from a third party "to the full
extent" of Medicaid's payments. 90 The general third-party liability
statute grants the state the right to recover from a third party "the cost
of benefits so provided."91 Clearly, the federal and state regimes on
assignment and third-party liability are not a complete match. The
Court noted, just as the court in Martin v. City of Rochester, 2 that the
interaction of the federal and state assignment provisions was somewhat
questionable as to whether the federal provisions provide a minimum or
a maximum for the causes of action that a state can require a recipient

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 1761-62.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1396k(b) (2000).
Ahlborn, 126 S. Ct. at 1761.
57 P.3d 1067 (Utah 2002).
Ahlborn, 126 S. Ct. at 1761-62.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(b)) (brackets in original).
Id. at 1762.
Id.
See generally ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-77-301, 307 (West 2001).
Id. § 20-77-307(a).
Id. § 20-77-301(a).
642 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2002).
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to assign. 93 As a result of this ambiguity, the Court held that this
aspect of federal and Arkansas Medicaid statutes does not necessarily
94
conflict.
B.

Protecting the Recipient: The FederalAnti-Lien Provision

The Court also concluded that the federal anti-lien statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p,95 provided grounds for preemption.9 6 As stated above, this
provision prohibits the placement of liens on a recipient's property before
the recipient's death.9" Prior opinions on the classification of the
recipient's settlement or award have been highly contentious. The courts
in Houghton and Wilson employed the logic that since the state's lien
automatically attached to the proceeds, the lien prevented the property
interest of the recipient.9 " The Martin court developed the underlying
legal theory a bit further to hold that the recipient retained a property
right to the damages, and thus retained a right to the proceeds for all
damages other than medical expenses.99 ADHS attempted to use the
Utah and Washington courts' approaches and argued that the automatic
lien made the settlement proceeds property of the state rather than
property of the recipient.'0 0 The Court highlighted two logical errors
in ADHS's argument,'0 ' but a more important idea emerged during
this discussion. Pointedly leaving the question of whether the anti-lien
provision blocks all recovery from awards and settlements, 10 2 the Court
adopted the interpretation that the federal assignment statutes
represent an exception to the anti-lien provision. 3 Nevertheless, this
exception is limited to the Court's interpretation of the assignment
statutes as only requiring assignment of rights to damages for medical
expenses."' As a result, the anti-lien provision provides the necessary
grounds for preemption, and the Court held Arkansas's "third-party

93. Ahlborn, 126 S. Ct. at 1762.
94. Id.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 13 9 6 p (2000).
96. Ahlborn, 126 S. Ct. at 1763.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(1).
98. Houghton, 57 P.3d at 1069; Wilson, 10 P.3d at 1066.
99. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 13.
100. Ahlborn, 126 S. Ct. at 1765-66.
101. Id. at 1764. The Court held that ADHS's argument failed first because Arkansas's
statute explicitly states that the lien attaches to the proceeds received by the recipient, and
thus, the lien attaches to the property of the recipient. Id. Second, ADHS's argument
failed because if the proceeds were already state property, why "would ADHS need a lien
on its own property?" Id.
102. Id. at 1763 n.12.
103. Id. at 1763.
104. Id.
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conclusion."1 °5

unenforceable insofar as they compel a different

C. Beseeching the Court: Policy Grounds for a JudicialException
Similar to prior court holdings, ADHS attempted to argue policy
°
rationales and congressional intent.'O
According to ADHS, the Court,
in equity, should allow Medicaid to recover from the entirety of a
settlement to prevent the "inherent danger of manipulation in cases
where the parties to a tort case settle without judicial oversight or input
from the State." °7 The Court observed that the risk of a party in a
tort settlement allocating away Medicaid's interest is avoidable by state
participation and that the result of allowing such recovery would be to
discourage settlement in a large number of cases.'
Nevertheless, the
Court concluded that this issue was not relevant to the current
proceedings, as the parties had already stipulated to the precise amount
that represented medical expenses.0 9
ADHS's alternate argument, that Congress's intent was for Medicaid
to be the payer of last resort, received little attention. While the Court
did not explicitly reject the use of the legislative history and intent to
support ADHS's interpretation of the federal Medicaid statutes, the
Court characterized ADHS's position as having a "conscious disregard for
the statutory text.""0 Adopting a strict approach to statutory interpretation, the Court revisited a topic debated by lower courts and administrative agencies to provide uniformity of judicial outcomes. In deciding
Ahlborn, the Court clearly asserted that federal Medicaid statutes
preempt corresponding state statutes that seek to recover from a
recipient's third-party recovery any amount in excess of that which
reasonably represents compensation for medical expenses.
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The Court's decision in Arkansas Department of Health & Human
Services v. Ahlborn"' will affect several different areas of both federal
and state law. The first issue for the federal government is the conflict
between the judicial and executive branches resulting from the Court
choosing not to defer to the Department of Health and Human Services's

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1767.
See id. at 1764-67.
Id. at 1764.
Id. at 1765.
Id.
Id. at 1767.
126 S. Ct. 1752 (2006).
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clearly stated point of view. The Court differentiated these opinions on
the grounds that these opinions did not address the anti-lien provision.112 Nevertheless, the Court's broad holding could be refined and
limited by subsequent decisions as the state and federal agencies and
the courts attempt to operate under these new guidelines. On the other
hand, the overall holding is not likely to change, as this decision was
unanimous.
The federal government might also witness some changes in the
Medicaid laws and Department of Health and Human Services
regulations and adjudications. If Congress agrees with the Court,
Congress might act to clarify the sections of the statues that caused
problems-those that could lead to multiple reasonable interpretations.
If Congress disagrees with the holding of this decision, then legislation
could follow to mitigate the effects of this decision. First, Congress could
easily adopt a new Medicaid statutory provision describing the meaning
of "property" to be less than the definition ascribed by the Court. As
well, the legislature and agencies could adopt other measures to end-run
this decision or provide alternative sources of reimbursement. After all,
Medicaid does need some source of funding.
Changes are also likely to take place on the state level. After the
Court's decision, states are much more likely to take on a greater role in
a Medicaid recipient's litigation. As state involvement in Medicaid
recipient litigation is already provided for under the federal scheme as
well as most state schemes, there will be no need for any additional
legislation. More state participation would allow the state to protect
Medicaid's interest to the greatest extent possible and to participate in
settlement negotiations. Naturally, this increase in state responsibility
could lead to difficulties in cooperation between the state and the
Medicaid recipient; the recipient will probably be much more willing
than the state to settle the case for less than full recovery. Such
difficulty could even cause problems with joinder in civil cases, as the
state will want sole authority over any settlement. The underlying
difficulty for the applicable state agencies, a difficulty that the courts do
not appear to recognize, is the resulting budgetary and resource drain
such litigation would place upon state agencies.
One final implication deals with the Court's footnote 12, which
explicitly left open the question of whether the federal anti-lien provision
proscribes any reimbursement from a Medicaid recipient."' The Court
stated in the main text that this provision, when read "literally and in
isolation[,] ...[could] ban even a lien on that portion of the settlement
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proceeds that represents payments for medical care."" 4 This note
could suggest that the Court wants to return to this issue. Regardless,
the Court is unlikely to adopt the assertion that the anti-lien provision
is a complete bar, as none of the laws currently in existence purports to
do this. To the contrary, the majority of courts prior to this decision
were willing to narrow the effectiveness of the anti-lien provision. Even
Martin v. City of Rochester,"5 which foreshadowed the Court's position,
held the anti-lien provision was not a complete bar. 6 As a result, the
Court is unlikely to pursue any further change with respect to this
provision.
This opinion will make a great deal of difference in the application and
funding of Medicaid budgets. Not only does this decision affect how the
states administer and supervise Medicaid and recipient litigation, but
also there will be a large budgetary effect for the federal government,
which pays over half of each state's Medicaid bill. If for no other reason
than this immediate budgetary concern, congressional action to rectify
or accommodate to this new precedent is highly likely.
SEAN SANDISON
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